How does one convert VHP

Reality Bites - UTTAM SENGUPTA

Religious conversion, said Mahatma Gandhi, is a matter between man and his maker.
But the BJP, which arguably is not opposed to Christians embracing Hinduism or to Richard Gere becoming a Buddhist, has promised to bring in an anti-conversion law in Jharkhand.

The media reported that conversion would be banned by the law. Presumably what they meant was “forcible conversion” because voluntary conversion is guaranteed by the Constitution. It is a little silly of course because the victim of alleged forcible conversion can still reach out to the police and of course to the Sangh parivar for protection.

But neither BJP nor the chief minister has cared to explain why they feel it is so important to bring in the legislation. How many complaints of “forcible” conversion have they, or the police, received so far? How many such people does the BJP state president Yadunath Pandey know personally?

It of course serves a political purpose to divert attention from other issues — religion after all was said to be the opium of the masses---and by projecting a perceived threat, the party can hope to mobilise a certain group of gullible people. But as the Ayodhya experience would have shown them, it is like riding the tiger. It is difficult to dismount because the tiger then would devour you.

One hopes better sense prevails and the BJP drops the issue. If Krishna temples are coming up in several parts of Great Britain the Hindus must be terribly insecure to require an anti-conversion bill. Besides, it is such a waste of energy and time. Surely the NDA government in the state has better things to do ?

The paranoid sections of our society have already ensured that foreign missionaries are no longer allowed into the country. The ones who came here and made a mark are leaving us steadily.

Educational institutions which had the benefit of foreign missionaries would vouch for their sincerity, commitment and contribution. After the foreign missionaries have left or dropped dead, these institutions are no longer the same.

And having studied in such institutions for more than a decade, this writer can say with conviction that he did not come across a single case of “conversion”, forced or otherwise, during all those years.

The first Christian missionaries arrived in the Chotanagpur plateau via Chaibasa. And the first to arrive were not the Catholics but German protestants who travelled through Chakradharpur and Khunti to Ranchi. The Anglicans and the Catholics followed. That was a century and a half ago and in the late nineteenth century Christian missionaries did convert a large number of people, specially tribals.

Indeed the conversion of village headmen would be deemed to mean the conversion of the entire village. Thousands of conversions took place during the last quarter of the nineteenth century and by the First World War, Christian missionaries were well entrenched in Chotanagpur.

The Catholics proved to be more aggressive, more imaginative and more enterprising and hence gradually the Protestants were left behind as the Catholic priests proved their managerial prowess by setting up a string of schools, colleges, hospitals, orphanages and special institutions. Many of them were set up in remote areas and provided tribals and the local people the chance of a lifetime to transform themselves. The new faithful benefited in various ways.

The Catholic Cooperative Society, relief society etc. came up to offer the converts provisions at cheaper rates, easy credit and assistance in times of crises.

The material and tangible benefits might have attracted a few more people to change their faith but had their number been significant, the Christian population in the state would not have been just four per cent or around 11 lakh people. Tribals are said to constitute 27 per cent of the 2.69 crore people, which would come to around 70 lakh people in all. In other words, assuming that all Christians in the state are tribals, the ‘infidels’ constitute around 16 per cent of the tribal population in the state. Or 84 per cent of tribals in the state, according to the last census, are not Christians.

The Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) would obviously claim that the number of Christians in the state would have been higher but for their aggressive campaign against conversion.

The VHP has been at the forefront of the anti-Christian tirade, dubbing missionaries as anti-social, questioning their integrity and periodically organising ‘purification’ (shuddhikaran) sessions to re-convert them into ‘Hinduism’ the ‘misguided’. It has now made the somewhat bizarre claim that there are ‘undeclared’ Christians in the state. Tribals in Jharkhand, VHP leaders believe, have converted to Christianity in large numbers but have not acknowledged it publicly. They are biding for time, the VHP fears, and would suddenly rise one day and come out of hiding.

The spectre clearly haunts them but surely that is not a good enough excuse for a legislation. If the government is serious about anti-conversion bill, the least it can do is to issue a white paper on the subject first.

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Only a fair press can be a free press

Only a fair press can be a free press

- By Fali S. Nariman

In the dictionary — not the Oxford or the Cambridge — but in a lesser known work, the Doubter’s Dictionary, "ethics" is defined "as a matter of daily practical concern described glowingly by those who intend to ignore it."

To me "media ethics" means fetters, not freedom. Many years ago the London Times in a grand editorial stressed the importance of public faith in the press as being more fundamental than any constitutional guarantee: "Those who wish to maintain the freedom of a nation must stand behind the editorial freedom of the press, even though they know it will sometimes be abused and often wrong in its judgements. Those in the press who want to maintain its freedom must also try to raise the standard of its news-reporting, its sense of responsibility, its willingness to report all sides and its essential fairness. Only a fair press will retain the public confidence that is needed by a free press."

There we have the right balance — in public perception, it is only a fair press that can really call itself a free press.

Freedom of the press is cherished in all free societies (and tolerated) not for the benefit of the press as an institution but for the greater public good. A.H. Sulzberger, president of the New York Times, made the point many years ago, when he said, "The crux is not the publisher’s freedom to print; it is rather the citizen’s right to know." (William Safire’s Political Dictionary, page 614)

This new right, the right to know, has successfully shouldered itself into a position of pre-eminence under most legal systems of the world including our own.

The role of the press (in referring to the "press," I use the word compendiously encompassing all forms of mass communication including dissemination of news and views in the electronic media) in a state governed by the rule of law is pre-eminent. While it must not overstep the bounds set by law: for instance, for the protection of the reputation of individuals (which includes public officials in the state), it is nevertheless incumbent on the press to impart information and ideas on political questions and on other matters of public interest. Such other matters may also include questions concerning the position and treatment of minorities, and of democratic institutions including courts.

Not only does the press have an obligation to the public which it serves of disseminating all such information and ideas freely and fearlessly — but the public has also the right to receive them. If it were otherwise, the press would be unable to play its vital role of "public watchdog."
The press is also the only means by which politicians and the public can verify whether judges (insular and secretive as a class) are discharging their onerous duties in a manner that is in conformity with the tasks constitutionally and statutorily entrusted to them.

A vigilant press is the handmaiden of effective judicial administration. The press does not simply publish information about cases and trials but subjects the entire hierarchy of the administration of justice (police, prosecutors, lawyers, judges, courts), as well as the judicial processes, to wider public scrutiny.

Free and robust reporting, criticism and debate contribute to public understanding of the rule of law, and to a better comprehension of the entire political and justice system. It also helps improve the quality of these systems by subjecting it to the cleansing effect of exposure and public accountability. "Sunlight" as Justice Brandeis once said, "is the best of disinfectants. And electric light is the most efficient policeman."

But the question remains: is there a legal basis for the notion of a responsible free press? I believe there is: responsible, yes, but not responsible to any government; or to any business tycoon, or magnate or politician; or to any mantra like "media ethics." The press is responsible only to the Constitution which has given the fourth estate this freedom: responsible to help propagate the ideals and purposes in Part IV of our Constitution (Directive Principles of State Policy).

Every Constitution must have an ideal and purpose, and the more I get acquainted with this longest Constitution in the world the more I believe that its heart is in Part IV.

If we look for the reason why we have floundered, over five decades why we have not been able to successfully work the Constitution — despite the efforts of editors, politicians, lawyers, commissions and committees — it is only because we have not had the will to implement the Directive Principles of State Policy — principles declared fundamental in the governance of the country. The Constitution has imposed a duty on the state to apply these principles in making laws: and it is the responsibility of the press to make governments in the Centre and in the states alive to that duty. Call it "ethics" if you like, but that is about the farthest extent I would go in propagating media ethics.

That the press should be responsible and responsive to some ideal is a view not widely shared abroad.

The UN had organised a conference in Durban (South Africa) in August 2001 on racism — which gave rise to much controversy in India as well, because one of the side questions was whether caste was an issue akin to racial discrimination. In her message to that conference, the then UN high commissioner for human rights, Mary Robinson, had a statement assigning to the news media an ethic — what she described as "a moral and social obligation to fight racism and associated evils." But it was not well received by the world press. The World Press Freedom Committee which operates from the US shot off a newsletter, a copy of which was forwarded to me. It took strong exception to the statement. "The news media’s job is to report news — not to support particular social principles," said the chairman of the World Press Freedom Committee. And in a letter to Mary Robinson he said, "The press must not be assigned roles or obligations by outside forces": that was the theme, the so-called justification for absolute press freedom — that is, freedom also to preach racial discrimination or "associated evils"!

The World Press Freedom Committee (in my view) was tilting at windmills. There are no absolutes in freedoms anywhere. In our Constitution we have Article 301 contained in Part XIII. It says that "subject to the other provisions of this Part, trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India shall be free." It is modelled on Sec. 92 of the Australian Constitution which provides that "trade commerce and intercourse among the states shall be absolutely free." But what is "absolutely free"?

The question arose in a case (from Australia) that went up to the Privy Council: In a celebrated passage frequently quoted, Lord Wright said, "The first question is what is meant by ‘absolutely free’ in Sec. 92. The word ‘absolutely’ adds nothing. The trade is either free or it is not free.

"‘Free’ in itself is vague and indeterminate. It must take its colour from the context. Compare, for instance, its use in free speech, free love, free dinner and free trade. Free speech does not mean free speech; it means speech hedged in by all the laws against defamation, blasphemy, sedition and so forth; it means freedom governed by law." [James vs Commonwealth of Australia 1936 (2) AER 1449 at 1473 PC]

Freedom of the press in the US Constitution is expressed in terms which are absolute: "Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech or of the press…" Professor Tribe calls it the "Constitution’s most majestic guarantee." And yet down the years, the Supreme Court of the US in a catena of decisions has set its face against any absolute freedoms in the free-speech-and-press cases: the decisions are laboriously set out, analysed and studied in the course of nearly 300 printed pages of Professor Tribe’s book. (American Constitutional Law, Second Edition by Lawrence Tribe Chapter 12, pages 785 to 1061)

Freedom of the press not being absolute, should the media then not be sensitive to some aspects in society? How should they react? Let me begin with a personal anecdote.

Before December 1998 I was instructed, and was appearing for quite some time, as the senior counsel for the state of Gujarat in a public interest litigation in the Supreme Court of India — a PIL filed on behalf of tribals who were displaced and to be displaced by the rising height of the Narmada Dam in Gujarat.

The principal question was whether the indigenous people of this country had an inherent right to live wheresoever they chose and in the manner in which they had been living for centuries, or whether and to what extent they could be compelled to shift to higher locations in the wider public interest. Linked to all this was the question of whether there were adequate measures of rehabilitation provided by the state government. While this case was pending, the then chief minister of Gujarat, called on me at my residence in New Delhi.

It was a courtesy call, but since a few days before he called on me I had read from press reports that Christians in certain parts of Gujarat were being harassed and their Bibles were being burnt, I told him that this action (though having nothing to do with the Narmada case) was something which was totally anathema to me and I would like to see this stopped. He assured me it would be, and in fact said that really there was nothing in it.

Then a couple of months later since there was some policy decision to be taken about improved measures of rehabilitation in the Gujarat case, the then chief minister again called on me. The lot of the Christian minorities had worsened by then. The media had reported that not only Bibles, but churches were also being desecrated, and some destroyed, in various parts of the state. I was extremely annoyed and told him that unless this improved I would have to do what I thought was correct in the circumstances.

Again came more reassurances, but all to no effect and then ultimately in December 1998 since nothing was done at all by the then Gujarat government to alleviate the plight of the Christian minorities, I returned my brief and said I would not appear for the state of Gujarat in this or in any other matter. This caused quite a furore.

The point of the story is not my bravado in returning the Gujarat brief, the point is that but for the revelations by the media — that is, its responsibility as a free press to disseminate information which was of concern to the general public — I would have been ignorant of and would not have known (living in the capital city of Delhi) about what was happening in remote parts of Gujarat.

It was the press which brought these attacks on minorities to light. And I think that it disclosed a very important aspect of press responsibility (or if you don’t like the word "responsibility," of press ethos) — which is, to lean always on the weaker side, and to effectively perform the role of an Opposition to a government whether it is a government at the Centre or of a state. This to me is one of the finest attributes of a free press and the essential role of a responsible press. And this is why when dictatorial governments take over and parliamentary systems of governments are given a go by, the press is always the first victim (next come the lawyers especially the human rights activist lawyers, and then the NGOs).


Introducing "media ethics" would make the press supine: my advice is leave it alone because — particularly because — tyranny fears newspapers; not the rest of the media, not television, only newspapers. Tyrants live in fear of them, and suppress them when they can: sometimes they do it gently calling it "media ethics" ("don’t criticise our top leaders etc, etc"). Sometimes they do it not so gently. The infamous Martial Law Decree of General Jaruzelski, (issued in Poland in December 1981), when a wide range of civil liberties were banned, is a case in point. It is worth quoting in full:

"Good afternoon, Comrades,

"I have the responsibility and the honour of providing to you the rules which have been constructed by the People’s Party to ensure that all our citizens enjoy the restoration of order and truth.

"First rule: Distribution of any publications and the use of printing equipment of any kind will require prior government approval.

"Second: Mail, telephone services and other telecommunications are suspended. They will resume as soon as the Censorship Directorate is fully staffed.

"Third: One radio station and one television station will be operating — both from the capital. I will be the commentator.

"Finally, you may ask what you should do to obtain the government approval necessary for any printing. We are working on that. We’ll let you know.

"Meantime, please understand, Comrades, no newspapers."

No newspapers, that was the thrust of the martial law decree in Poland issued in December 1981. And it had its effect, it was only the endurance and courage of the leaders of Solidarity and other great nationalists that helped overthrow the Jaruzelski government — but not without a fight, not without bloodshed.

Jaruzelski’s Decree must never happen again, anywhere. It can never happen again in a free society governed by the rule of law.

But what about abuses of information, circulation of false information and character assassination by the press? The Press Council can take care of that — but it must remain a Press Council without much bite: any form of press control degenerates into government control. Are the blessings of a free press really worthwhile?

There is only one answer to this and it was given effectively by India’s Supreme Court way back in 1950 — the year of the birth of our Constitution. Justice Patanjali Sastri speaking for himself (and Chief Justice Kania, and Justices Mahajan, B.K. Mukherjee and Das) in a Constitution Bench decision in Romesh Thapar’s case, said: "Thus, very narrow and stringent limits have been set to permissible legislative abridgement of the right of free speech and expression and this was doubtless due to the realisation that freedom of speech and of the press lay at the foundation of all democratic organisations, for without free political discussion no public education, so essential for the proper functioning of the processes of popular government, is possible. A freedom of such amplitude might involve risks of abuse. But the framers of the Constitution may well have reflected, with Madison who was the leading spirit in the preparation of the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution, that ‘it is better to leave a few of its noxious branches to their luxuriant growth, than, by pruning them away, to injure the vigour of those yielding the proper fruits" (Quoted in Near v Minnesota, 233 US 607 at 717-8) (AIR 1950 S.C. 124)

That answer held good in 1950. It must hold good today.


Fali S. Nariman is Senior Advocate, Supreme Court of India, and the president of Bar Association of India

Interview with Dr RM Pal on Hindutva and Fascism in India

Interview with Dr. R.M. Pal on Hindutva and Fascism in India

"Hindutva and Fascism have much in common"
-- By Yoginder Sikand

9 January 2004

Dr. Rai Mohan Pal, a noted Indian human rights activist, used to teach English at Delhi University. He has edited the Bulletin of the People's Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) and the monthly Radical Humanist founded by M.N. Roy. Here he speaks to Yoginder Sikand about the human rights’ movement and the struggle against Hindutva and fascism in India.

Q: You have been quite active in speaking out against Hindutva. How do you link the movement against Hindutva with the wider human rights movement in India?

A: Hindutva, as I see it, is the modern form of Brahminism. I believe that Brahminism and fascism share much in common, and just as the philosophy of fascism is based on the negation of human rights, so, too, is the philosophy of Brahminism. In fact, Brahminism is a philosophy based on the gross violation of the fundamental rights of entire social groups—women, Shudras, Dalits and tribals, as well as groups such as Muslims, Christians, Buddhists and Sikhs, who, when added up, form the vast majority of the Indian population. The violation of the rights of so many mi11ions of people because of the caste system upon which the Brahminical religion is based is as important a concern for us as theviolation of rights by individuals or the state. Unfortunately, not many groups in India today, even within the human rights movement, are giving due importance to this societal violation of human rights.

Fascism is a major source of human rights' violations the world over. It has its own philosophy which takes different forms and adopts different methods in different contexts, but the philosophy remains the same. M.N. Roy, the founder of the Radical Humanist movement, was the first to point out the fact that the roots of fascism lie in the ancient Brahminical religion, and he showed how European, particularly German, fascist philosophers borrowed concepts from Brahminical scholars and scriptures, concepts such as the Aryan race theory, the supremacy of the strong over the weak, the concept of the tyrannical superman and so on. In fact, M.N. Roy issued a' sharp warning to Indians not to fall prey to Hindu revivalism because he saw that it was nothing but fascism in a different garb. You can see that for yourself. What was the destruction of the Babri Masjid and the mass slaughter of the Muslims but naked fascism? Goebbels, Hitler's chief propagandist, wrote in one of his books, 'The state must have the power to break its own laws'. That is precisely what happened on 6 December, 1992. The state was actively involved in the breaking of the mosque. Goebbels also remarked, 'Repeat a lie- a hundred times and it becomes a truth'. You can see this Chanakyan tactic in all the false Hindutva propaganda about Muslims, Christians and Communists. See what horrendous and baseless things they are writing about Muslims in the school textbooks now. They have attributed all the ills of India tothe Muslims, painting all of them as immoral.

Q: Could you elaborate further about your claim of the Brahminical rootsof fascism?

A: The social basis of Brahminism has historically always been the caste or varna system, and so it remains till this very day. And what is the ideology of varna but a reflection of fascism? The Nazis divided humanity into five categories: the so-called 'pure' Aryans, such as blonde, blue-eyed Germans; other Europeans; the Slavs; the Asiatic peoples; and, lastly, the Africans, whom they hardly considered human beings at all. Likewise, in the varna system, which is described and prescribed in all the texts of the Brahminical religion, starting from the Rig Veda, humankind is divided into five groups or varnas, which are placed in a steeply hierarchical order—the Brahmins; the Kshatriyas; the Vaishyas; the Shudras; and others like the so-called 'untouchables' and other non-Hindus, derisively called Mlecchas, who are described as 'unclean',because they refuse to recognise Brahminical hegemony, and so are considered almost beyond the pale of humanity. You can see from this why so many top RSS leaders so highly extolled Hitler.

Q: How do you view the link between what you call Brahminical fascism andHindutva nationalism?  

A: M.N. Roy had studied this matter in great detail and dealt with it in many of his writings. Unfortunately, as events have unfolded over time, there appears to be a very thin dividing line between fascism, Brahminism and the dominant form of nationalism in India today. We need to reject this straight-jacketed nationalism, this enforced homogeneity, and instead allow for the expression of pluralism, tolerance and secularism. India has always been a very plural society, but frankly, given the horrors of the caste system and the way women here have been treated, who can say that India has been a tolerant society, despite all that Hindutva propagandists claim to the contrary?  You just have to see how the Dalits were and still are treated in the most unimaginably cruel way, how women were forced to jump into the funeral pyres of their husbands, and how Buddhism was driven out of the land of its birth by Brahminical revivalism, to realise the hollowness of the claim that India has been the very epitome of tolerance. And this ugly intolerance is not just a thing of the past. I believe that the mass killings of the Sikhs in 1984 was basically due to the fact that the Sikhs had started refusing to be considered as Hindus, stressing that they were a separate community. This could not be tolerated by the advocates of Brahminical supremacy, who felt that the Sikhs should be taught a 'lesson' to bring them 'in line'. What is this if not naked fascism?

Q: Could you elaborate further on your point regarding the relationbetween dominant forms of nationalism and fascism?

A: As I see it, the dominant notion of nationalism constitutes as divisive an ideology as communalism or fascism. It is based on hatred of the other', so that today the test of being a,'true' Indian has become the intensity of one's hatred for Pakistan or China or whatever. In a country like India, such a form of nationalism becomes a dangerous cult. India, to reiterate a point I made earlier, has no option but to be secular and pluralist and tolerant. This means that we must be guided by a philosophy of humanism.

We just cannot attempt to be a nation-state in the sense of nineteenth century political science theory. We have to recognise that although we have been a highly pluralist society, we have never been tolerant, so the task before us is to retain our pluralism and seek to develop a climate of tolerance. Now both of these—tolerance and pluralism—are directly threatened by nationalism as it is articulated and especially by the ideology of Hindutva. The advocates of Hindutva talk about protecting pluralism, but that is not a pluralism based on equality. Their brand of pluralism demands that Dalits and Muslims and other marginalised and oppressed groups must remain under the Brahminical umbrella as wholly subordinate. This is sheer intolerance.

Q: How do you think the struggle against Brahminism can be carried forward?

A: Unfortunately, we who are struggling for a tolerant and secular society do not seem very clear about our own philosophical and ideological postulates. Hindutva fascism has to be fought at the ideological level, by a superior ideology based on rationalism, and not just on the political plane. A political party challenging the forces of Hindutva can very soon be accommodated by Brahminism, as we learn from the events of recent history. There is no other way out but a philosophical and cultural revolution. Unfortunately, we have never had a total philosophical revolution in this country. Buddhism tried to do this 2500 years ago, but then it was driven out by the Brahmi nical revivalism led by Shankaracharya, who himself used Buddhist tools and concepts for thispurpose. Reformers like Kabir and Nanak tried to do it by challenging Brahminism, but soon their followers converted themselves into cultic orcaste-like groups or separate communities.  Kabir and Nanak were converted into cult figures and their radical message of social revolution was forgotten. Instead of revolutionising the entire society, the Kabirpanthis and the Nanakpanthis emerged as new communities, thus adding to the already bewildering number of castes. I am of the firm opinion that unless we have a philosophical revolution in India today, real and meaningful social change in India is impossible.

Hate Campaign against Christians in India

Hate Campaign against Christians in India by the RSS chief.

‘Gujarat Samachar’ Daily,
Ahmedabad, Gujarat State.
Dated: 07/07/05
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Christians want to hoist flag in Asia We have to stop them: Sudarshan

(Through Correspondent)

Christian Popes have converted European Countries to Christianity within one thousand years. After that they have converted African Countries into Christianity, now their eyes are fixed on Asia.

Spending lost of money they are trying conversion. There is need to bring awakening against it. Hindu Community has to gain such power that none can dare to open eyes and see to it. These words had been uttered by Shri K. Sudarshan the Chief of R.S.S. at Sabaridham.

During the meet of Provincial Preachers of Sangh at Surat, Shri Sudarshan who remains at by from media Little but in strong words he had asked the members to get ready against the invasion.  At 11 A.M. Shri K. Sudarshanji, Leaders Mohan Bhagvat and Shri Bhaiyaji and the carvan of other propagandists had reached to Shabaridham after  watching  Dangi Dance Shri Sudershanji had addressed the propagandists.

He said that at present the disease of conversion has spread in the country.  The Hindu community has to be awaken On one hand Muslim Jehadi Terrorists ate attacking and on other hand the conversion activity is been carried out by Christians The christian popes have done only one thing in the world and that is conversion.  In 1000 years they have converted the land of Europe into Christianity and in another 1000 years the flag of Christianity has been hoisted.

Now, the eyes of these Christians have fixed on whole Asia including India for that so billion dollars fund   has been collected by America from that 20 billion dollars will be spent in India alone. They have tried to break Hindu community again Hindu there is Islamic terrorism Naxalite and the dragon like trap of Christians to free from this Hindu community has to dare.

With anger he told to the propagandists that this is not the time to sleep. The Hindu community has to show such might that no demonic power will dare to raise eyes to see.

Moreover at present the population of Muslims is increasing in India. It seems that within 60 years their population will Surpass Hindus if it increases at present rate. It is time to take steps to prevent population of such people. For all these only Hindu awakening is the remedy.            

Free hand Translation

The Day Shahrukh was Upstaged

The ceremonial atmosphere lent the required solemnity to the occasion of the investiture ceremony of the Padma awards. The grandeur of Rashtrapati Bhavan, could hardly be missed. The Darbar Hall was packed with guests, and then the ceremony began.

The home secretary called out each awardee's name one by one, and s/he rose up and approached the President. It looked like a routine affair, with no interest, except to the recipients.

But there were surprises in store for me. I found myself, much to my delight, sitting next to Gladys Staines, wife of Australian missionary Graham Staines who was burnt to death along with his sons in Orissa in 1999.

A simple women, draped appropriately in a sari, she had a pleasant smile. She told me, "The first thing my daughter said to me, on arrival, was, 'Mama, I am glad to be home.'" Gladys Staines now spends time between India and Australia, her daughter is studying in Australia.

She only had two passes to the event and did not know she could have requested for a few more. She felt sorry that many of the people who had worked closely with her in Orissa, were not with her on that day. I suggested that they could still come, and we could request for a pass, but they were in Pune.

Among the awardees of the year were several public personalities, including Shah Rukh Khan, Olympic silver medalist Lieutenant Colonel Rajyavardhan Singh Rathore, sports women and academics. The legendary R K Laxman of the Common Man fame from the Times of India, media barons and a host of musicians and dancers.

Each awardee was applauded in due course. However, I soon realised, that regardless of whether you were a Padma Vibushan or a Padma Shri, the audience had its own way of rating you. Their applause said it all.

I thought to myself, surely, but surely, Shah Rukh Khan would get the loudest applause. He thought so too. He had come in to Rashtrapati Bhavan with eight bodyguards, who would not allow fans to get anywhere near him.

Then came the most thrilling moment of the evening.

It was Gladys Staines who got the loudest applause. The audience went crazy over her, holding up the ceremony for a few minutes. She received her medal and walked back to her seat.

The other person who got a loud applause was Olympian Rathore. Both of them were awarded the Padma Shri.

I suddenly broke into a comfortable smile and relaxed. I thought to myself, a nation that knows how to recognise its heroes, is on the right track. For a brief moment, my accumulated anger over the genocide in Gujarat vanished. The people of this country have more sense than its politicians. They should be allowed to decide who to award and who not to award.

The ceremony over, we were invited for a group photograph. Again I found myself sitting next to Gladys.

She was sitting next to the President and the home secretary. Like a young girl, she turned to me and said, "I am sitting close to the President."

I looked at her and said, "Are you surprised, after all you were the President's nominee?"

She asked me how I knew that. I told her it was all over the Indian press. She smiled and said she was unaware it.

Clearly, Gladys Staines stole the show that day. She certainly made it a memorable day for me.

Indira Jaisingh, the wellknown lawyer and civil rights activist, was also awarded a Padma Shri at Rashtrapati Bhavan.

Courtesy: Rediff.com

Jhabua's Harvest Of Hate

By Harsh Mander

The Hindustan Times

21 March, 2004

A smouldering unquiet stalks the air in Jhabua. The arid undulating fields of this Bhil tribal heartland in Western Madhya Pradesh have yielded this year a vastly different harvest from the past - a harvest of hate. For the first time in the history of the district, Christian homes and properties, mainly of tribal converts, were targeted and destroyed in many locations.

As I walked through the torched and looted homes in Alirajpur - scorched walls, savaged roofs now open to a hostile sky, everything contained within these homes either looted or destroyed in malevolent bonfires, the terrified residents in hiding, places of worship desecrated or vandalised - it brought back painful memories of so many riots that I have been burdened to witness in the past in my work. Except that this time, the victims, the manufactured enemies were new, and the burning winds of violence had traversed virgin territory, sweeping through a remote tribal region inhabited by a proud and colourful people, that had never witnessed sectarian violence in its entire history. How many new frontiers of hatred will the warriors of hate open in our land?

On a quiet Sunday evening on 11 January 2004, a young nine year old girl was brutally raped and strangled in a public toilet within a church compound in the town of Jhabua. Her bloodied and savaged little body was discovered the next morning.

It did not take the organisations of the Sangh Parivar long to allege from the roof-tops that the priests in the church had raped and killed the child. Calumnies were heaped on the church in meetings and rallies organised across the district. It was even alleged that churches are bastions not only of anti-national activities but even of rape.

The Superintendent (SP) of Police, Mayank Jain, responded with exemplary impartiality and professionalism. Within four days, he arrested a young Hindu man Mahesh who confessed to the crime. The SP was immediately transferred.
Mahesh, who worked as a peon in an insurance office, lived close to the church.

The little girl sold vegetables with her 12 year old brother on a pavement outside the church. On the fateful evening, Mahesh bought vegetables from the children, but said he needed to borrow money from the church nuns. It was on this pretext that he took the little girl into the church, where he raped and killed her.

The Sangh Parivar organisations were furious with what they saw as the 'unseemly haste' of the police to solve the case. The next morning, on 16 January, a Sadhvi from Gujarat, Krishna Bahen, arrived with a clutch of her women followers at a predominantly Christian tribal village Aamkhut. There is an old church campus, where a white missionary ran an orphanage, dispensary and school hostel for nearly half a century. After her departure, the orphanage closed down but the school and dispensary continue.

The Sadhvi and her followers gathered some of the non-Christian tribal residents of the village and reached the school, where a board examination was in progress. The Sadhvi entered the classes and distributed highly inflammable pamphlets to the children, describing Christianity as an anti-national conspiracy to destroy the Hindu faith. She exhorted the Christian students to return to the Hindu faith, and abandon a faith that promotes rape and treachery. Her followers pulled off the chains with crosses that the children wore, and tore up the examination sheets. The teachers pleaded helplessly, then finally abandoned the examination and closed the school.

After the Sadhvi was finally persuaded to leave with her followers, crowds gathered at the police outpost to register their complaint. As the head constable insisted on awaiting the orders of his seniors, the newly elected Alirajpur MLA Nagar Singh Chauhan arrived with an enraged armed mob. The local residents also brought out their weapons. Bullets and arrows flew, vehicles were set on fire, and a young Seva Bharati volunteer succumbed to bullet wounds.

The SDM rescued the MLA and took him in his jeep to Alirajpur. There he gathered a large mob, as his followers exhorted revenge against the Christians on loud-speakers mounted on jeeps. The mobs then looted and burnt a number of Christian homes, mainly owned by government servants.

The subsequent police action has a familiar ring. Large numbers of Christian men, and even some women, including priests, have been rounded up. The Hindu mob-leaders, including the MLA with an old criminal record, walk free. The minorities are just beginning to learn the lessons of how to live with fear, with an openly partisan state.

Of a total population of around 12 lakhs, as many as 85 per cent of people in Jhabua are tribal. The church was established more than a century ago, but the percentage of Christians in the district is not more than 4 per cent. The manufacture of fear and hatred against this tiny minority is the result of long years of effort by several front organisations of the Sangh Parivar, especially Seva Bharati.

Their efforts were further galvanised five years ago with massive mobilisation and recruitment of educated tribal youth as RSS workers in virtually every village. They were drawn mainly from the Bhagats, tribal families converted by the Gayatri Parivar over the past two decades to vegetarianism and abstinence. The Bhagats had adopted Hindu gods and forms of workshops, like havans and deep yagyas.

In a massive mobilisation, tens of thousands of pictures of Hanuman were distributed in every tribal home, and he was re-invented as a tribal king. Triangular saffron flags were hoisted in hutments in every remote tribal hamlet.

Single-teacher Ekal Vidyalayas were opened by the Seva Bharati, and the local teachers indoctrinated into the ideology of the Sangh Parivar through a series of camps.

Typically both the Congress and the wide network of local NGOs watched helplessly. Even more typically, Congress leaders belatedly tried to join the bandwagon. As the Sangh Parivar organised huge Ganesh celebrations in which thousands of tribal people participated for the first time, local Congress leaders responded finally by establishing only their own rival Ganesh pandals!

On a wayside tribal market, discordantly festooned with aggressive saffron banners and flags, we stopped for tea at a small stall. The tea stall owner had pasted on his shop window a very different slogan from his neighbours:

Har dharam ka gulistan

Hai Hindustan hamara

(Our India is a garden in which every religious flourishes).

Amidst the swirling, steadily building storm of hate that is sweeping this remote tribal outpost, I wanted to hold the tea stall owner in an embrace.

Dalit Liberation Theology: Interview with James Massey

James Massey is a leading Dalit Christian theologian, one of the pioneers in the field. He has written several books on Dalit Christian theology. He has been the general secretary of the Indian Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge and a member of the National Minorities Commission. In this interview with Yoginder Sikand he talks about the Dalit Christians, Dalit ways of understanding Christianity and the challenges posed before the Dalit movement by Hindutva fascism.



Q: How do you account for the emergence of what is called Dalit
Christian theology?

A: Dalit Christian theology is a relatively new phenomenon, going back to the late 1970s. It is a reflection of the Dalit Christians, who form the vast majority of the Indian Christian population, becoming increasingly conscious of their Dalit roots, their Dalit condition and of being oppressed both within as well as outside the church. As a result of the growing consciousness of the Dalit Christians, they are beginning to ask how much of what they had been taught Biblically and theologically is actually relevant to their own social conditions. They are increasingly realizing that the way the Christian faith has been explained does not include the experiences of the Dalits—the Dalit Christians as well as the larger Dalit community as a whole. They are now saying that the sort of theology that is taught in the seminaries and preached from the pulpits of the churches is largely irrelevant for them because it does not take into account their oppressed condition, their experiences. So, I would say that the emergence of Dalit Christian theology is really only a part of a larger process of the emergence of Dalit consciousness.



Q: How would you define Dalit theology?

A: Briefly, I would say it is a systematic reflection on God and humankind from the perspective of the Dalit experience. It is our faith experience in a particular context put in a systematic form. Dalit Christian theology sees God as struggling alongside the Dalits in challenging the structures of caste and oppression, both within as well as outside the Church. But Dalit Christian theology, in order to be a complete, and not just a partial, theology, has to base itself on the experiences of the Dalits as a whole and not simply that of the Dalit Christians alone.



Q: How does Dalit Christian theology differ from non-Dalit Indian Christian theology?

A: Since Dalit Christian theology is based on the faith experiences of the Dalits, it presents a very different image of God and His role in human history from what it is depicted in the theology evolved by ‘upper’ caste Christians. Till now, Indian Christian theology has been based on either the experience of western colonialists or of ‘ upper ‘ caste Christians, who are a small, but, at the same time, a very powerful, minority within the Indian Christian community. Now, the problem of the ‘upper’ caste Christians is not social oppression or poverty but of how to relate to their former Hindu faith and ethos. That is why they talk in terms of ‘Christian Vedanta’, ‘Christian Bhakti’, ‘Christian Yoga’, ‘Christian Ashrams’ and so on. This resulted in what some have called the Brahminisation of Christianity. But the problems of the Dalit Christians are very different. For us the principal question is that of sheer survival, of denial of our social, economic and political rights. So, while in their theological formulations ‘ upper’ caste Christians were principally concerned with explaining Christianity in Brahminical categories, our major concern has been how our faith experience can help us win our rights. This is really what Dalit theology is all about.



Q: Where does the question of the importance of human history come into this?

A: Our own history is central for us in the way we seek to understand our faith. As we see it, Dalit theology is essentially a product of reflecting on Divine action in the history of the Dalits. So, like any other liberation theology, Dalit theology takes the issue of history very seriously. On the other hand, Brahminic Christian and Western Christian theology do not attach much importance to history. Brahminic Christian theology is based on the philosophy of Vedanta, according to which the world is illusory, while western Christian theology is based on the classical Greek dualism between the this–world and the other-world, between matter and spirit. In contrast, Dalit theology is deeply rooted in this world, in the this–wordly experiences and sufferings of the Dalits, and, rather than promising the Dalits a place in heaven, it inspires them to struggle for transforming this world to bring justice for the Dalits.



Q: What role does Ambedkar play in the writings of Dalit Christian theologians?

A: It is very unfortunate that traditional Indian Christian theology has completely ignored Ambedkar while reflecting on the Christian faith in the Indian context. This is because most of these theologians have been of ‘ upper’ caste origin. So, instead of taking inspiration from people of Dalit or Shudra background like Ambedkar and Mahatma Phule, they used the writings of ‘ upper’ caste writers and reformers like Raja Ram Mohan Roy or Keshub Chandra Sen or Gandhi in order to develop a contextual Indian theology. This is so despite the fact that Ambedkar wrote extensively on the Christian faith and church history and their relationship with the Dalits. Similar is the case with Mahatma Phule. In his Gulamgiri ( Slavery’) Phule develops a very interesting concept of Christology, the person of Christ. He refers to the story of the non Aryan king Bali, whose kingdom was snatched by the Brahmin Vamana. Vamana goes on to rigidly enforce the law of caste, converting the natives into Untouchables and Shudras. Phule tells us that in rural Maharashtra the ordinary village folk still long for the return of the righteous rule of Raja Bali, and he identifies Jesus as Bali. He says that Jesus and his disciples, the Christians, have come to India to rescue the Dalits and Shudras from Aryan or Brahmin hegemony. All this has been ignored by ‘ upper’ caste Christian writers.



Q: Yes, but are Dalit Christian theologians now paying attention to and drawing inspiration from the works of people like Ambedkar and Phule?


A: It is still not happening on the scale it should. Their analysis is yet to become an integral part of Dalit Christian theology. But increasingly I find that Ambedkar is beginning to exercise a powerful influence on Dalit Christian writers and this is bound to grow in time to come. Many of the things that Ambedkar wrote and said about the Christian faith and the Indian church in the 1930s are only now being said and written about by Dalit Christian theologians. In my own case. I am aware of Ambedkar’s writings and I use them directly or indirectly in all my writings.



Q: Are Dalit Christian writers also drawing on Dalit cultural motifs for developing their theologies?

A: Yes, this is happening, and we are trying to reclaim our Dalit heroes, most of whom were not Christians. So, we are using such radical figures as Kabir, Ravidas, Chokhamela and others. Now, these were revolutionaries in their own times, crusading against caste oppression. The Purushusa Sukta hymn of the Rig Veda, which describes the origin of Man, tells us that God created the Brahmins from the head of the Primal Man, the Kshatriyas from his hands, the Vaishyas from his thighs and the Shudras from his feet. But the Dalits and Adivasis do not even figure here, not even being considered as human beings! But what people like Kabir, Ravidas and others were attempting to do was to re-establish a relationship between the Dalits and God. And this Dalit Christian theology must take into account.





Q: What has been the reaction of the Church leadership, which is still largely ‘upper’ caste, to the emergence of Dalit theology?

A: Some have accused us of ‘dividing’ the church and of ‘misinterpreting’ Christianity. But, on the whole, I can say that the church leadership is definitely under increasing pressure from the Dalits because of their growing awareness of their rights that have been denied to them. And then there is also what we call in Christian theological terms, pressure from the Holy Spirit. This is forcing the Church to respond. Even those sections within the Church hierarchy who do not wish to see the Dalits advance are forced to respond, because they know that if they do not to do so, they will be left high and dry. They won’t have any space, so in order to save themselves they will have to become part of this process.



Q: Do you see any danger of the Church leadership co-opting the Dalit Christian movement so as to blunt its radical thrust?

A: That danger has always been there. Some non-Dalit church leaders would like to see compromise and accommodation in place of protest and struggle. But I don’t think they can succeed in their aims. And we are also particular that the leadership of the movement must rest in Dalit hands. For this purpose some of us have set up a group called the Dalit Solidarity Programme. It was established in 1992, with the help of the Inter-Faith desk of the Geneva- based World Council of Churches. Its aim is to bring Dalits of all religious and ideological back grounds – Christians, Muslisms, Hindus, Buddhists and others-on a common platform. Non-Dalits can not be leaders of this organization, they an only be ‘enablers. Because of this we had to sacrifice many non-Dalits, Christian as well as others, who had been all along claiming to be messiahs of the Dalits. As Paulo Freire writes somewhere, movements of the oppressed struggling for liberation must not let people from dominant classes enter their ranks and sabotage their efforts by appointing themselves as guides and leaders.

In 1997 we had our second convention, which was attended by some 300 people. At this meeting we decided to shift from programmes to working with people’s groups, so we renamed ourselves as Dalit Solidarity Peoples. As we began shifting towards closer collaboration with people’s movements, many Christians fervently prayed that our movement would die out. Since we became more of a people’s movement, we have had to lose the friendship of some senior bishops as well, who found our work too threatening to their own interests.



Q: Since your organization includes Dalits from all religious and ideological back grounds, do you also address the question of inter-religious dialogue?

A: Yes, that is a very important question for us. We have six presidents, out of which only one is a Christian. And because we all come from such different religious backgrounds we have taken the question of inter-religious dialogue very seriously. But our way of dialoguing is very different from how ‘upper’ caste Christian theologians go about it. For them, by and large, dialogue has taken the form of entering into debates about theological niceties with Brahmin scholars, arguing from texts and scriptures. But for us, dialogue starts not from scriptures but from our common condition of oppression.

This is what we call the dialogue of life—working with Dalits of other faiths for a common goal, that of doing away with the structures of caste and class oppression. In our organisation, our dialogue does not entail religion at all. Religion is not our meeting point. Our concern and our meeting point is our common oppression and suffering as Dalits.

Frankly, the time for theological debates is over and now the time has come for inter-religious dialogue to be based on issues of common social concern. If at all dialogue has any meaning for us Dalits, you have to tell us how much your faith can contribute in improving the lives of the millions of our people who are living in conditions worse than slavery. If religion cannot do so, then of what use is it? So, for us religion has worth only if it helps us in our struggle for liberation. And, therefore, we are now thinking of a project to identify liberative elements in every religion which can be used in our struggle.


Q: How does your faith as a Christian inspire you in your work for the Dalit cause?

A: In my work I draw my strength and inspiration from my Christian faith experience. I see Christ not decked up in silken robes wearing a golden crown, as he is depicted in the cathedrals and churches, but as the child of a poor village woman, the wife of a carpenter. Mary was so poor that the only place she could find to deliver her child was a manger, where cows and horses are tied up. It is a different matter that today people have tried to distort this image by constructing fancy mangers in palatial churches to depict Jesus’ birth during Christmas celebrations. When Jesus was born, the only thing that Mary could offer at the synagogue was a pair of doves, while the general practice was to offer a Iamb.



Now, Jesus, who was born in a desperately poor family, spent the whole of his life working for the liberation of the poor and the oppressed. That is why for me, as a Christian, it is a natural expression of my faith commitment to be involved in the movement for Dalit liberation, because Jesus, the person in whom I have put my faith, became for me what I am today—Dalit, oppressed and despised, in order that I and millions of others like me could be liberated. But if Jesus is my source of inspiration, people from other faiths may have their own sources from which they draw their strength, and that is fine by me.

In this connection it is very interesting to note that the word 'Dalit' is found in Sanskrit. Persian, Arabic as well as Hebrew, and in all these languages it means roughly the same thing: oppressed or weak. In the Bible the word 'Dalit' is used 52 times. In the Old Testament, the prophets are described as chiding traders and priests for their mistreatment of people whom they call 'Dalits'. Likewise, the prophet Isaiah foretells the arrival of a messiah who will come to deliver the 'Dalits' from oppression. So, this theme of God and His prophets working for the cause of the Dalits is one that runs right through the Bible.



Q: Has Dalit theology had a major impact in changing the attitudes and policies of the Church leadership vis-a-vis the Dalits? Or is it the case that Dalit theology is still largely confined within the walls of seminaries?

A: I am afraid that Dalit theology has yet to pick up and reach out to the Dalit masses. People like me may get an occasional chance to preach our ideas from the pulpits, but in India today there are very few Dalit theologians who have access to church structures to do so. If you measure the impact of Dalit theology in terms of concrete changes that the church authorities have been forced to make in matters such as resource allocation or leadership structures, then its influence has not been much so far. Take the case of elitist Christian schools. How many Dalit children have been admitted to them so far? These schools cater almost entirely to the 'upper' caste elites, Hindus and others. So, in this sense the churches we have are not the Church of Christ. Christ tells us to love our neighbours as ourselves. Who are the neighbours of the leaders of the Church? Are they the starving Dalits, who may share their Christian faith, or the rich industrialists who are sucking the blood of the poor and who send their children to elitist Christian schools in air- conditioned cars?

I have been trying, through my writings and speeches, to impress upon the Church to radically change its attitudes towards the Dalits, but the response, I must confess, has not been very enthusiastic. I have been the editor of the official organ of the Church of North India -The North Indian Church Review-for quite a while now. In my editorials I constantly question the Church leaders as to what they are doing for the Dalits. I have just written an editorial, in which I have discussed the various resolutions that the Church of North India has passed on the Dalit question in the last ten years. Every year for the last one decade the top-brass of the Church of North India have been meeting and issuing grand statements reiterating their commitment to the Dalit cause. But in one of their recent statements they have admitted that they have done almost nothing at all, so I am asking them: “What is the use of all this tall talk, of passing pious resolutions, when you are actually not serious about doing anything for the Dalits?” I have asked them: “If the mission statement of the Church of North India that the Dalit question has been missed by us at all levels is correct, then what are the reasons for the failures?”.



Q: How do you see the phenomenon of Hindutva and what implications does it have for the Dalits?

A: Hindutva has no place at all for the Dalits, the Adivasis, the Shudras. It has no place for their identities and it robs them of the right to speak for themselves, to struggle for their rights. From the point of view of Dalit interests, I see Hindutva as a very dangerous development. At its very root is the fear of Dalit awakening, and this is why the Muslims and Christians are being targeted by Hindutva forces as scapegoats, so that the Dalits rally behind the ‘upper’ castes instead of against them. And this is what is happening in Gujarat and other places. Christians are being attacked because they are conscientising the Tribals and the Dalits. This has nothing to do with conversions, because very few conversions are actually taking place. In fact, as the figures provided by the government itself make clear, the proportion of Christians has been going down with every successive census.

Hindutva Offensive Social Roots: Characterisation

R.R. Puniyani

Introduction

Last decade has seen the Hindutva onslaught going from strength to strength to the detriment of poor and oppressed sections of society. Though Sangh Parivar (SP), RSS and the paraphernalia of its affiliates, is at the core of Hindutva movement some other forces have also broadly contributed to the social and political agenda of Hindutva, the main such associate is Shiv Sena, prior to consolidation of SP, Hindu Mahasabha propogated Hindutva, while variable expression of Hindutva has also taken place through congress as well. The turmoil created by its offensive has disturbed the very fabric of our society, and this has threatened to change the very rules of social politics.

This movement is based on the premise that Hindus alone constitute the Indian nation as they are the original inhabitants of this land and have created this society and its culture. Hinduism, as per their assertion, is a very tolerant and catholic, which makes it superior to all other faiths, but its tolerance has often been mistaken for weakness...... The Hindu nation has been repeatedly conquered by aliens, particularly the Muslims and then the Christian British and must acquire strength through RSS Sangathan to counter all present and future threats. The subsequent entry and takeover by foreigners created the illusion that India was land of many different and equal cultures -- `Pseudo Secular' nationalists like Nehru, who preferred bondage to an alien system of thought, perpetuated it by integrating this notion within the `pseudo secular' constitution. This must be changed and only a `truely secular' Hindu Rashtra will afford protection to non-Hindus. The threats remain because the present state is ruled by traitors to the Hindu nation; `pseudo secularists' who `appeased' Muslims in their pursuit of a politics of `vote banks' (1). Its own perception of itself is thus of a movement meant to build a Hindu rashtra (nation) for the Hindus.

Formation of Hinduism as a Religion

Today's social common sense believes Hinduism to be the religion of all the people in India except those who are specifically Muslims, Christians or Buddhists. It will be interesting to note that contrary to the popular belief the truth is that "Hindus" and "Hinduism" are orientalist constructions originating with late eighteenth century British administrators who believed "the essence of India existed in a number of key Hindu classical scriptures such as Vedas, the codes of Manu and the shastras that often prescribe hierarchical ideas" -- a conclusion eagerly "supported and elaborated by Brahmins". (2) Britishers not only absorbed this understanding, they put an official seal on it "by applying a legal system based on Brahminic norms to all non-Muslim castes and outcastes, the British created an entirely new Brahmin legitimacy. They further validated Brahmin authority by employing, almost exclusively, Brahmins as their clerks and assistants. "(3) " -- this fabrication through repetition of India as unitary Hindu society has -- obscured the reality of a segmented society, with Brahmins and other upper castes exercising a monopoly of power, fabricated Hinduism is found everywhere." (4)

The historical process whereby Brahminism gained ascendancy has variously been formulated by different sociologists. To give one example, Arun Bose (5) paraphrases Mill's beliefs, "The ideological and a fortiori social, political and economic development of Indian society was arrested at a primitive nomadic stage by the sterilizing despotic power of ruthless caste of Brahmin priests who fabricated more successfully than any other priestly caste ever known, myths and legends to deceive, oppress and exploit the remaining castes, particularly the Sudra caste. By draconian punishments, reinforced by legends about creation and the cycle of rebirths through which strict conformity with caste taboos was rewarded and infringements penalized, they were able to enforce total and resigned submission to their omnipotent power."

Initially the term Hindu began with regional tones. The term was coined by Arabs and others, who pronounced `S' as `H', and to denote the people living on this side of Sindhu (Indus) they called them Hindu. Its only much later that this term was bestowed with a religious meaning. Nehru (6) pointed out that "Hinduism as a faith is vague, amorphous, many sided, all things to all men. It is hardly possible to define it, or indeed to say definitely whether it is a religion or not, in the usual sense of the word, in its present form, and even in the past, it embraces many beliefs and practices, from the highest to the lowest, often opposed to or contradicting each other."

Formulating it more sharply to bring to focus the caste factor, Hinnells and Sharp (7) concede that "A Hindu is a Hindu not because he accepts doctrines and philosophies, but because he is a member of caste', thus implying that Hinduism is a social order and not a religion.

Romila Thapar (8) in her analysis posits that "The new Hinduism which is being currently propogated by the Sanghs, Parishads and Samajs is an attempt to restructure the indigenous religions as a monolithic uniform religion, rather paralleling some of the features of semitic religions. This seems to be a fundamental departure from the essentials of what may be called the indigenous `Hindu' religions. Its form is not only in many ways alien to the earlier culture of India but equally disturbing is the uniformity which it seeks to impose on the variety of `Hindu' religions."

Hindu sects are multiple and diverse with many founders, and these sects have survived over a period of centuries. At times scholars used the word for a group of different indigenous religions which could vary in their belief system from animism to atheism, which are looked at with suspicion by todays votaries of Hinduism. Thapar goes on to say (8) "Hinduism as defined in contemporary parlance is a collation of beliefs, rites and practices consciously selected from those of the past, interpreted in contemporary idiom in last couple of centuries and the selection conditioned by historical circumstances." -- in a strict sense, a reference to `Hinduism' would require a more precise definition of the particular variety referred to Brahminism, Brahmo-Samaj, Arya Samaj, Shaiva Siddhanta, Bhakti, Tantricism or whatever."

The two major religious categories which existed were Brahminism and Shramanism. Shramans were those who were often in opposition to Brahminism, these are the groups which had belief structures away from Vedas and Dharmashastras. Their teachings transcended castes and communities, and in contrast to Brahminism which categorised religious practice by caste, shramanic religions opposed this in order to universalise their religious teachings. Bhakti tradition emphasised selfless action projected as the need to act in accordance with ones' moral duties. This shift of emphasis, away from Brahminical rites and sacrificial rituals provided the root, in later time, for a number of cults like, Shaiva, Vaishnava and many others, it also provided the rough outline to much that is viewed as traditional `Hinduism'. Lot of variationsoccurred in this tradition. Much later Kabir and Nanak brought in sufi ideas in their teachings. Shakta sect and Tantric rituals also gained wide popularity. These are now played down as being anathema to the current version of Hinduism, i.e. Brahmical Hinduism.

The religious practices of untouchables and tribals have a lot of rituals which involve offerings and libations of meat and alcohol. Also these groups could not afford the costly donations required for Brahmical yagnas. Gradually dharma (religious duty) became central to religion, regarded as sacred and which had to be performed in accordance with one's varna, jati and sect and which differed according to each of these. Thapar (8) goes on to add "`Hindu' missionary organisations, taking their cue from Christian missionaries are active among the adivasis, untouchables and economically backward communities, converting them to `Hinduism' as defined by upper caste movements of the last two centuries. That this `conversion' does little or nothing to change their status as adivasis, untouchables and so on and that they continue to be looked down upon by upper caste `Hindus' is of course of little consequence."

Jainism and Buddhism were the major amongst Shramanic tradition. These religions were persecuted in many parts of the country. The premodern Hinduism was not a monolithic religion, as being projected by the SP, but was a juxtaposition of multiple religious sects.

Thapar calls the Hinduism, currently being propogatead as `Syndicated Hinduism'. This projection is made by the social base of the SP, a powerful urban middle class with a reach to rural rich who find it useful to bring into politics, a uniform, monolithic, Hinduism created to serve its new requirement. The Hinduism which more or less has won the social space and draws mainly from Brahminical texts, and also draws from Dharmashastras. The attempt of this exercise is to present a modern reformed religion. The net result is a repackaged Brahminism. The Hindu communities settled abroad, look for a parallel to Christianity, as their religion. This is to overcome the sense of inferiority and cultural insecurity which they experience in their life. Thapar goes on to say " Syndicated Hinduism claims to be re-establishing the Hinduism of pre-modern times; in fact it is only establishing itself and in the process distorting the historical and cultural dimensions of indigenous religions and divesting them of the nuances and variety which was a major source of their enrichment." To put the understanding in a linear way: "The Hindu religion as it is described today is said to have its roots in the Vedas, -- In any case, whatever we call the religion of these nomadic clans, it was not the religion that is today known as Hinduism. This (Hinduism in its current version) began to be formulated only in the period of Maghadha-Mauryan state, in the period ranging from Upanishads and the formation of Vedantic thought to the consolidation of the social order represented by Manusmriti. Buddhism and Jainism (as well as the materialist Carvak tradition) were equally old - Hinduism as we know it, was in other words, only one of the many consolidations within a diverse sub-continental cultural tradition, and attained social and political hegemony only during the sixth to tenth century A.D., often after violent confrontations with Buddhism and Jainism (9).

As per Gail Omvedt (9) this Brahmanic Hinduism adopted and identified with the authority of the Vedas and Brahmans. Material base of this system was the caste structure of the society. Its cooptive power was qualified to the extent that dissidents had to accept their place in the caste herarchy. The masses of people did not have the identity of `Hindu'. Multiple local gods and traditions existed side by side forming the base of popular culture. Later only during colonial period this identity of Hindu was constructed for all the inhabitants of this land except those who were followers of Islam or Christianity.

This construction was thrown up by English scholarship and by Indian elites. Gail posits that "In the nineteenth century, people like Lokmanya Tilak adopted the "Aryan theory of Race", claimed a white racial stock for upper caste Indians and accepted Vedas as their core literature. Tilak was also the first to try and unite a large section of the masses around brahmanical leadership with celebration of Ganesh festival - also by the end of 19th century, Hindu conservatives were mounting a full scale attack on their upper caste reformist rivals with the charges that latter were "anti-national." One gets a clear idea that SP has succeeded in perpetuating a perception amongst Hindus to forge a communalsolidarity through elective projections of the past, and this does involve a deliberate reformulation of history. Emergence of nation state does bring in its wake and imposes a homogenisation. In case of India this evolution of "national religion and Hinduism has mainly been defined in opposition to the Muslim "other".

Construction of Hindutva

The construction of Hindutva is to be seen in the backdrop of emergence of Hinduism as a homogenous religion. The concept of Brahminical Hinduism, projected as Hinduism was at the root of multiple religious revivalist movements. Its political translation began mainly with Bal Gangadhar Tilak, who initiated the Ganapati Festival to wean away the popular participation of lower castes people in Muharram festival. Some sociologists (10) have called such ideological maneouvers as "manipulative reinterpretation of cultural material" and "invention of tradition." Later Tilak went on to organize a festival in honor of Shivaji, who broke the Moghul hold on western India and opened the way for rampage of Maratha armies through much of India. A strong anti-muslim slant was brought into the function.This nationalism was based on hate of Muslims. At the same time Ram, was popularised as a symbol of moral power, along with Hanuman symbolising the masculine strength. Shivaji's guru Ramdas had the image of anti-Muslim crusader and this was highlighted by Tilakites. Guru Ramdas's vision was limited to ending the Moghul rule and establishing Brahminical hegemony. Guru Ramdas was also given prominence in the initial phases of RSS activities. Shivaji tradition was and is an important means for Brahminism to assure themselves of the essential similarities of their interests and those of current society.

Anti-Muslim sentiments were consistently used by Tilak to project a political methodology of consolidating the Hindus. Starting from Bankimchandra Chatterji, various other Hindu national ideologoues had whipped the fear psychosis with Muslims as the ones' threatening the survival of Hindus. All these fabrications were manufactured and propogated by the ascendant, nascent, amorphorphous Hindu nationalist forces. The combination of `syndicated Hinduism' with nationalism was brewed by Vinayak Savarkar who can be called the first exponent of the doctrine of Hindutva. The mix of Brahminical Hinduism with nationalism reflecting the interests of upper castes and part of upper class was defined and later refined on the exclusionist principles, which are so basic to the Brahminism. Savarkars initial anti British struggles were very impressive. After his assuming the role of the proponent of Hindutva his major energies were channelised in strengthening the politics of hate, the formation of communal Hindu Mahasabha and helping RSS from distance.

Savarkars politics was a rival to Gandhian politics. Gandhi the representative of Indian Nationalism was branded as conciliator and appeaser of Muslims. Savarkar propounded that struggle for supremacy would begin after British left and that the Christians and Muslims were the real enemies who could be defeated only by "Hindutva". His key sentence was "Hinduize all politics and militarize Hindudom". His definition of a Hindu was the one who regarded this land from Indus to the Seas as Pitrabhumi (Father land) and Punyabhumi (Holy land). This land belonged to Hindus and so by implications Muslims with Holy land in Mecca and Christians with Holy land in Jerusalem, can not have equal status to `Hindus'. This was later to be made more explicit by Guru Golwalkar, who despite adoring Hitler, was 'generous' and 'kind' enough to these 'aliens' by granting them the status of second class citizens. Also began the concept of "Hindu Raj" the precurser of present SP goal the `Hindu Rashtra'.

The final crystallisation occurred with foundation of Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) which became the `Father' organization for plethora of organisations which were to take birth after a period of consolidation of the core swayamsevaks (volunteers).

Birth and Growth of RSS

With the transition of leadership of Congress from the Brahminical Tilakites to Nationalist Gandhi, transition in the anticolonial struggle took a major leap. Gandhi's Nationalism, though used religious idioms was not a religious nationalism and unlike the religious nationalism of Tilak, was able to inspire the large section of Indian masses into anticolonial struggle. With the leadership of Congress slipping away from the Chittapavan Brahmins, with the dissatisfaction with Gandhi's conciliatory methods and in the backdrop of the slipping hegemony of Brahmins over the lower castes, the idea of an organisation representing the aspirations of these high castes took roots and this is what gave birth to RSS (in 1925), an explicitly Hindu organisation, working for the achievement of Hindu Rashtra and calling it a `Nation'. Thus the synthesis of religious construct, Hinduism and Nationalism got crystallisation through this organisation, which in due course, was to take the central place in the political battles of upper castes, displacing the Hindu Maha Sabha.

RSS decided to model itself on `Hindu Joint Family' and on analogy with the patriarch of Hindu joint family created the post of Sar Sangh Chalak (supreme dictator). Its emphasis was, one, physical fitness of volunteers and their training in methods ofstreet battles (Not battles against the British Raj), and two, it started discussion groups, the Bouddhiks, where the glorified Hindu history was (and is) shoved down the throats of trainees. This non-dialogic, authoritarian mode of teaching emphasised the core of RSS doctrine as per which, during the glorious Hindu past of vedic times, the glorious Hindu Kings ruled this Bharatvarsha in the most Hindu way. The Hindu society is the most tolerant society, the chosen race, the society which gave wisdom to the world. However, this tolerance of Hindus was misconstrued by the Muslims who invaded this holy land and converted the people on the force of the sword. This rule of Muslims has created big problem for the Hindu Nation. Later the rulers of this country, under leadership of Gandhi, have appeased the Muslims and pampered them. After independence Nehru took over Congress whose pseudosecularism pampered the Muslims and the Hindus are suffering in their own country. Now the time has come to rise in the defense of holy Fatherland, to consolidate the Hindu Nation, Hindu Rashtra through the organisation of the Hindus, the RSS."

After its formation RSS got lot of support from Brahmins/Banias, landed aristocracy and a small section of petty bourgeisie. It concentrated on so called `cultural' work of spreading the Hindutva doctrine by molecular permeation, keeping aloof from the anti British struggles which were being led by Gandhian Congress. It went to the extent of ridiculing the 1942 Quit India Movement and supported the British war effort. It also encouraged its followers to infiltrate in army, bureaucracy, and the police. After independence it helped in the formation of first, the Bharatiya Jana Sangh and later Bharatiya Majdoor Sangh, Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad, Vishwa Hindu Parishad and a plethora of organisations have sprung up in last few decades. Its social presence had been inconspicuous till mid eighties. The first time it got broad notice was when one of the trained cadres of RSS, Nathuram Godse, killed the Father of Indian Nationalism, Mahatma Gandhi. Later it got noticed for its `anti communist' noises during India China War in 1962. Despite low social visibility it strengthened itself by continuing to `train' the cadres who occupied crucial positions in army, bureaucracy, police and media. The second major social recognition of this organisation came with JP movement in early seventies, when riding on the wave of middle class movement, JP launched a mass struggle and permitted the `committed' RSS to be a part of it. This recognition of RSS by a figure like JP, helped to wash a bit of the `sin' of the murder of Mahatma Gandhi.

Following the emergency and elections, Janata Party of which Jan Sangh became one of the constituents came to power. After the split in Janata Party, the old Jan Sanghis unwilling to break their RSS connection, split from Janata Party to form Bharatiya Janata Party on the agenda of Gandhian socialism. This probably was due to the calculation that socialism was a popular cliche and can be encashed upon. Despite its prolonged sustained work, RSS did not get its social visibility till quite late and its political arm did remain a marginal force. What transformed this marginal force into a major political power?

Indira Gandhi, loosing her popular appeal, did subtly try to win over the `religious nationalist' social base of upper castes by communalising the Kashmir and Punjab problems. With Rajiv Gandhis' blunder on Shah Bano, it was necessary to appease the Hindu communalists by opening the locks of Babri Masjid. This gave a lot of fillip to the Hindu communalists. Later VP Singh's regime implemented Mandal Commission recommendations. And this was 'The' point which transformed the Indian politics. The reaction to Mandal Commission was a wide spread backlash of the upper castes, especially in Hindi belt. BJP cleverly encashed upon it by giving an emotive touch to the political events. SP by a masterstroke projected Hindutva, Mandir issue as the core of social problems. It was not possible for BJP to directly oppose Mandal Commission, also it had to express the aspirations of its social constituency, those opposed to the social justice, those for status quo, those for privileges of upper castes. Advani's Rath Yatra campaign came at a time, by which the industrialisation process had thrown up a new layer of petty industrialists, also in north the construction of Hindu identity was strongest amongst this new layer and the earlier Brahmin/Bania/Rich peasant, upwardly mobile middle classes (an unavoidable mix of caste/class categories).

The movement, Hindutva, which existed only as an ideology so far, got the real flesh and blood with the consolidation of anti-Mandal sentiments. The social sector which was supporter of Religious nationalism, which was living in the category `us' in contrast to the category of the `other' the Muslims swung into a social action to aggressively guard its privileges and status. The cultural onslaught of VHP (Ramshilapujan and the like) came in to supplement the political campaign of BJP and the heady mix of religious emotive symbol and political agenda of protecting the interests of the upper castes, watered the so far dormant, poisonous seeds of SP movement, culminating in the demolition of Babri Masjid and accompanying nationwide anti-Muslim progroms, reaching their crescendo in the Shiv Sena controlled anti-Muslim riots in Bombay and the ghastly rape of Muslim women in Surat.

The political force which had a semi-notional existence till mid 80's, and was mainly surviving on the ideological fodder of `ban cow slaughter', `Indianise Muslims', `abolish article 370' and the like as an ineffective social distraction, found its moorings and strength in late 80's to create a `social monster' which after a `acute' beginning of early nineties has crystallised itself as a social political and ideological force asserting its political agenda at every opportune moment in the society.

Social Base of Hindutva Movement

One will like to add a comment about the relations of Hindutva with Congress and Shiv Sena. Congress came up mainly as a 'national', anticolonial movement but Hindutva was constantly associated with it, at times dominant, at times hidden and at times a marginal accompaniment. Under the leadership of Tilak Congress was the vehicle of Hindutva in a major way. With Gandhi assuming the leadership of Congress, Hindutva was subjugated to the main 'anti-British' project and was side tracked. But it existed within Congress all the came. Lala Lajpat Rai, Bipin Chandra Pal, Madan Mohan Malaviya, Sardar Patel and later Purshottamdas Tandon were the main 'Hindutva' votaries. Also there was a uniform scatter of these 'strong saffron' to mild saffron leaders at all the rungs of leadership. With Nehru assuming strong 'socialist, secular' principles as the state policy, the Hindutva elements kept themselves maintaining their roots. After Nehru's demise and with change in social dynamics, Indira Gandhi veered to upper castes as the main support base, the upper caste vote bank, in 84 electrions.

Rajiv's Congress lost out the battle for the 'upper caste' vote bank, to the blatant puritan and unadulterated upper caste agenda of BJP, which since then has not looked back and has by now become 'The' vehicle of Hindutva politics, marginalising the Congress from the upper caste arena. All in all though Hindutva has played a 'hide and seek' expression in some periods, through Congress. But it is the BJP which has been the major and preferred vehicle for Hindutva agenda. Shiv Sena, which thrived on the 'sons of the soil' garbage, watered from the backyard by some elements of Congress, came up strongly in Bombay. Supported by the big capital, it unleashed a'physical annhilation' of communist labor leaders in Bombay.

After exhausting this agenda, it temporarily campaigned against the 'lungiwallahs' (South Indians), and Gujarathis before latching on to the upswinging Hindutva movement. In the process it boosted and supplemented the SP, playing the combine role of a mini Maharashtraian BJP and the storm tropper Bajrang Dal (the lumpen 'son' of R.S.S., specialising in anti-muslim onslaught/pogroms). In early simmerings of its emergence this movement to begin with was spearheaded mostly by Brahmins. Its support came from the landed aristocracy and some layers of middle classes. Most amorphous sections identified with the Gandhian Nationalism, while the subulterns identified more with the movement of Ambedkar or the communist parties.

Despite the training of cadres, dedicated, committed, ascetic on so on, the reach of religious nationalism was confined to Brahmin/Bania/Rich peasant and petty bourgeoisie in the Hindi belt in Northern India. And the failure of its campaigns on cow slaughter ban, Indianise the Muslims, was well indicative of that. Even the communal riots which began from 60s began with a slow pace and picked up more and more dangerous proportions with passage of time. The ideological propagation of Hindutva and the rise of its support base went hand in hand, and by late seventies and early eighties the anti-Muslim riots began to assume horrendous proportions.

Though BJP and its predecessor the Jan Sangh began with small electoral support, this support was well designed. It was the urban middle classes, sections of twice-born castes, and the Banias. Let us have a brief look at the changes in social composition which have occurred during last 50 years of the republic. The proportion of urban population has gone up by 20-25 per cent. They also constitute the ones' having derived maximum benefit of modern education and the facilities thrown up by the industrialization process. They do have a sort of dominant presence in the society. The cultural, social and political aspirations of this sector is the ground on which has risen the edifice of SP.

To understand the social base of the SP we will like to go into the regrouping of social groups in Gujarat. Nandy et al (11) have described this process in detail. Along with urbanisation there has been a parallel process in which the rich peasants of Gujarat have achieved an enhanced social status. These Patidars', (cash crop farmers) caste has been upgraded by a process of religious manoeuvering. The polarisation of middle class (Brahmin, Bania) and Patidar occurred around 1980, around the issue of reservations for the lower castes. In 1981, Gujarat witnessed an extreme form of caste violence directed against the lower castes. These antireservation agitations played a key role in consolidating the base of upper castes and upwardly mobile middle classes. SP directly or indirectly stood by to support this upper caste onslaught.

By using clever strategies SP was also able to give an upwardly mobile channel to a section of Dalits, aspiring a better place within Hindu society. In Gujarat, one can clearly see the social functionality of creating the `other'. Here earlier the ultimate object of hate was the dalit, by a clever manoeuver, the Muslim is substituted for that, the dalit is unleashed upon the "other", a atmosphere of terror is created, which helps to maintain a `status quo' of social hierarchy. The core of this social base was given a cohesion by various Yatras and campaigns by VHP.

Basu, Datta, Sarkar, Sarkar and Sen in their enlightening work `Khakhi Shorts Saffron Flags' (1), have tried to trace the roots of SP movement. They correlate it with the rise of new religiosity around worship `Jai Mata Di', `Jai Santoshi Ma', around functions like `Jagrata' and pilgrimages like `Vaishno Devi'. All these which emerged in northern states in late 60's and early 70 got co-opted and colored by the VHP campaigns. Basu et.al. identify a significant social base of SP in new urban middle class, spreading in small towns as well, which has come up due to the rapid growth of relatively small enterprises and the accompanying trade boom. "These small scale units flourish without the concomitant growth of organized working class, since individual work-places are far too small to consolidate the labor force and enable effective unionization." This type of industrial development, based on screw driver technology has mushroomed all through in 70's and 80's. This newer middle class tends to be fragmented into smaller more individual units. "They are marked by intense internal competition and steady pressure of new opportunity structures, ever expanding horizons for upward mobility and a compulsive consumerism that keeps transcending its own limits. The very pressure of growth is disturbingly destabilizing; the brave new world of global opportunities creates anomie and existential uncertainties." (1) The Green Revolution in parts of UP has increased rural purchasing power feeding into the boom in urban enterprises, consumerism and trade.

Characterisation of the Movement

Most of the social scientist have characterised this movement as a communal one. The broad perception amongst the segment of liberal, progressive intellectuals is that this is a communal movement, spearheaded by the SP, to strengthen the social and political power of Hindu elites. It's most commonly perceived activity is to train the cadres in its core doctrine to float the different organisations (BJP, VHP, Bajrang Dal, Swadeshi Jagran Manch, Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram, etc.) which overtly spread the communal venom against minorities in general and Muslims in particular. By now the success of SP (Sangh Parivar) in communalising the social space, infiltrating police, army and bureaucracy is well recognised. And it is, and is broadly perceived as a communal movement.

`Religious nationalism' is a characterisation by many a sociologists who pick up the assertions of these movements and give them a decent looking veneer (13). In Juergansmeyers' understanding the religious nationalists see the failure of democracy and socialism, both western models, leading them to conclude that secular nationalism has failed. And so they view religion as a hopeful alternative, which can provide a basis for criticism and change. As per him the differences amongst various religious leaders are immense, but they all share one thing in common - seeing Western secular nationalism as their enemy and their hope to revive religion in public sphere. Juergansmeyer hesitates to call these movements fundamentalist as this word tends to suggest "an intolerant, self-righteous, and narrowly dogmatic religious literalism." The term is less descriptive and more accusatory. Also it is an imprecise term for makingcomparisons across cultures. The better term for this phenomenon is offered by Bruce Lawrence (14) which suggests a global revoltagainst secular ideology that often accompanies modern society.

The 'modern' according to this are those who are `modern' while opposing the values of modernism. Also fundamentalism does not carry any political meaning and conveys the idea of solely being motivated by religious beliefs rather than broad concerns about the nature of society and the world. The term religious nationalist conveys the main meaning of religious and political interests and also holds that there is no clear distinction between religion and politics, as this distinction is a mask of western thinking.

But this characterisation is not able to totally understand different broad and deepfacets of its offensives. Also it isnot able to explain the intensity and sustained nature of this movement. To fill this gap some social scientists and activists like Ram Bapat, characterise this as being a fundamentalist movement, akin to the one in countries like Iran (12). As per this formulation Indian fundamentalism, like the global one which exists everywhere in post industrial societies, has been generated by the system of advanced capitalism or late capitalism.

In third world countries it is in a manifest form in contrast to the latent form in advanced countries. Bapat feels that due to lack of power of public opinion of the progressive world at the turn of century, the first world is making every attempt to put fundamentalism on top of the agenda for the world politics and even for military purposes. After the decades of 60s and 70s, which constituted the years of triumph of socialism and also of emancipatory nationalism, the next two decades marked the beginning of revivalism and fundamentalism. Originally fundamentalism developed in America where capitalism faced a lot of turmoil from 1870 to 1930. Similarly other countries when faced with severe economic crisis, came up with the fundamentalist response from some sectors of society. In America this fundamentalist response came in the form of a movement which asserted the revivalist trend to identify essential absolute to enable American citizens to take on the force of darkness. Bapat makes a pertinent point that since 1818, Maharashtra, amongst all Indian states has served as a kind of hot house plant for sustaining all kinds of orthodoxy, revivalism, fundamentalism and communalism, particularly of Hindutva variety. To begin with Fundamentalist Hindutva is not the Hinduism practised by millions of people. It (the Hindutva) is an imaginary Hinduism which is essentially extra-historical, extra-religious and is a political credo for those who want to make much of the ideology for their political ends. The fundamentalism is neither based on traditional modes of thought nor traditions as they existed. They win over people by propogating of `manufactured traditions.'

They adopt the gains of modernity, science, technology, weaponary and industrial production. It wants a modern apparatus of life without the necessary relations between human beings which would give them space to struggle for their rights. In nutshell, it wants to achieve a certain modern culture i.e. the modern production process sans the accompanying space for improvement of human relationships. It is a post feudal phenomenon aimed at inventing a new identity for the ruling classes.

It uses the language of religious discourse. Fundamentalism is possible only in semitic religions. The semitisation process of Hinduism is going on from last many decades. This semitic Hinduism which in fact is the Brahminical Hinduism has discovered the Book in `Gita', the holy deity in `Ram' from amongst hundreds of contenders for this status. The attempt of this fundamentalist movement is to read their interests and programmes of the present into the past. Bapat feels that Sangh Parivar is not fascist as, fascism does not lean upon religion to give it the cohesive aggressive slant. In contrast Aijaz Ahmed, K.N. Panikar, Sumeet Sarkar and many other sociologist characterise the SP as being Fascist. As per Sarkar (15) the SP movement may not look exactly parallel to the German Fascism, but a closer look at the pattern of affinities and differences helps to highlight the crucial features, notably as the implications of the offensive of SP go far beyond the events of 92-93. The drive for Hindu Rashtra has put into jeopardy the entire secular and democratic foundations of our republic. It is onlyHindu communalism, and not the Muslim communalism which has the potential of imposing fascism in India. Sarkar points out that Fascism was introduced in Italy and Germany through a combination of carefully orchestrated street violence (with a mass support) and deep infiltration into the police bureaucracy and the army, with the connivance of 'centrist' political leaders. Hitler, for example, had repeatedly asserted his party's respect for legality even after coming to power, but meanwhile his colleague Goering, Nazified the German police, organised street encounters in which more than 50 anti-Nazis were murdered and set the scence for Reichstag fire; after which first the communists and then all opposition political parties and trade unions were quickly destroyed. The methodology adopted in destruction of mosque is so much reminiscent of the same method. The mosque is demolished in 51/2 hours in total violation of supreme court order and repeated assurances given by leading opposition party, and the central government does not even lift a finger till the mosque is totally razed to the ground. Countrywide riots follow, police partiality is painfully obvious, the land grabbing vandals build a temporary 'temple', illegally, and this structure is protected, while the political force behind this, the BJP alternates between occasional apology and more frequent aggressive justification, while their brother organisation, the VHP adds Delhi's Jumma Masjid in the list of Hindu monuments and denounces the Indian constitution as being anti Hindu. The beating up of journalists on Dec. 6, is no surprise as the fascists forces, who carefully cultivate the press usually, like to combine persuasion with an occasional big stick.

Unlike the Fascism in Italy and Germany which came into power within a decade or less of its emergence as a political movement, Hindutva had a long gestation period, which has given added strength and stability to the movement and it has been a long enough time for their ideas to become part of the social common sense. Sarkar correctly points out that the real base of Sangh Parivar remains the predominantly upper caste trader professional petit bourgeoisie of cities and small town mainly in Hindi heartland; with developing connections perhaps with upwardly mobile landholding groups in countryside. He quotes Daniel Gurien's definition of fascism as "not only an instrument at the service of big buisness, but at the same time a mystical upheaval of the petite bourgeoisie. Specific linkages of big business with fascism remain controversial. By a sustained propaganda work SP has succeeded in creating a communalised common sense in which Muslim has become a near equivalent of the Jew - or the Black in contemporary white racism. As per SP the Muslim in India is unduly privileged a charge much more absurd than it was in Germany where Jews had been fairly prominent and well to do. In India Muslims are grossly underrepresented in business, bureaucracy, army, police, private enterprise etc. Here the alleged privileges are the appeasement of Muslims by pseudosecularists.

Like Hitler in Germany, the SP arrogates to itself to be representative of Hindus, who are in majority, and thereby its democratic credentials are above board. Similarly since SP is 'The' representative of Hindus, any body deviating from its line is anti Hindu at worst and pseudosecular at best. Unlike Jews who had to face the gas chambers, Hindutva line is 'kind and generous' and offers a second class citizenship to the Muslims.

The constant anti Muslim violence, euphemistically called 'communal' riots has succeeded in ghettoising large chunks of the Muslim population. Also unlike Nazis, SP grounds the identity on religion.

Aijaz Ahmed (16) calls it Hindutva Fascism and points out that it differs from the Italian and German ones' on the ground that it speaks relatively rarely of economic instance and fashions its ideological discourse along categories of 'nation' and community seeking to obtain the identity between these two categories nation and community - through methodical use of violence as a political instrumentality. Hindutva has nationalised the violence as a means for capturing state power. As per Ahmed the whole series of mass spectacles, mobilizationsand blood baths that began with rath yatra and culminated in the demolition of masjid on one hand, and terrorization of Bombay on the other has introduced into Indian politics a qualitatively different dynamics, pushing the urban culture of diverse regions across the country in a distinctly fascist direction,and giving to the new phase of Indian communalism a form at once hysterical and methodical which is similar to that of European anti-semitism.

The true object of SP's desire is not submission of the muslims alone but of state power as a whole, and remaking of India in its own image. This, it is achieving by imposing a homogenisation on the lines of Brahminical ethos on the society. Concieved and executed as at present, the SP fascist project has some limitation since it does not 'pose' to be radical enough to win over the masses and India is too diverse a country to buy SP's homogenisation at a quick pace.

The Hindu Right (SP) has been equated with Nazi Germany by Jan Breman (17), who points out that popular support for Hindutva primarily stems from social sections which enjoy better life than earlier generations were used to. " - both (German Fascism and Hindutva) originate within and also appeal to the petty bourgeoisie, a composite class which is growing in size and political weight". Despite minor differences Breman posits that there are deeper similarities. Nazi ideology worked into a pseudo religious dogma, while Hindutva has packed its gospel in purely religious terms. This religiosity of Hindutva is a mere facade for a more comprehensive societal reconstruction which is very materialistic in nature. Breman, who was born and bred during Hitlers reign and has also seen the Hindutva onslaught from close quarters, gets a distinct feeling of de ja vu. This is partly because of the fact that similar to the Hitler regime here also one community is singled out as arch enemy of the people (the nation), the Hindu majority. The persecution of Jews in Nazi Germany was planned and controlled by the party machinary. Though in the maze of propaganda which gives advanced legitimization to the pogroms which are to follow, the Hindutva offensive tries to cleverly masquerade its role in the pogroms on Muslims. This is possible because of a clever division of labor between 'father' (RSS) and different 'sons' and 'daughter' of this 'parivar'. RSS trains the cadre in ideology, BJP plays this game on political chessboard, VHP gives an emotive touch to the communal project by roping in the Sants, Mahants and the NRI's, the Rashtra Sevika Samiti backs up the RSS ideology by taking it in the sphere of home, and the Bajrang Dal translates it in to the street violence, which can take off only because of the ground work done by other members of the 'parivar'. This was painfully obvious on Bombay and Surat in 1993. In addition the Hindutva forces encouraged hunt against the deviant forces, with those upholding the secular ethos, being next on the firing line.

But unlike the Jews in Germany, Muslims are no capitalist sharks, so their 'privileged' 'appeasement' is projected and they are shown to be a pampered lot. Also part of this aggression is justified by their political domination and harassment of Hindus in the medieval times. Bremen sharply perceives the project of Hindu right-"marginalised as Mohammadi Hindus they may be allowed to hide in their own ghettos, cordoned off like the judenvierter"were in the Nazified Europe. In their defiled habitat they will live beyond the pale, as new untouchables in a modern India which is thoroughly Hinduised".

Trying to take a broad and critical look at the Fascist analogy of Sangh Parivar Achin Vanaik (8) theorises the phenomenon of fascism and uses it for analysing Hindu Nationalism. Vanaik feels that fascist paradigm is inappropriate and of very limited value for situating not just Hindu nationalism but a whole host of political phenomena, particularly in the third world. There are important similarities and dissimilarities between Hindutva and Fascism. To take up dissimilarities first: lack of charismatic leader in SP, absence of an explicitly anti-liberal/anti-democratic and anti working class themes, absence of any verbal anticapitalist demagogy, absence of any orientation to the theme of a 'generalisational revolt' etc. Vanaik states that though Fascist formations can draw their support from all classes, they are not multiclass political formations or movements. They are not a form of authoritarian populism. "Fascist formations win ideological and political hegemony because their decisive victories are achieved on non-ideological terrain. Their momentum is convulsive. They grow rapidly but they also fade out fast if they do not achieve power. In postcolonial societies the political vehicles of religious fundamentalism or religion based nationalism are not so much the fascist formations as, at most, potential fascist formations, where that potential may or may not be realised. While fascist state in India would necessarily be Hindu nationalist, the Hindu nationalist state would not ecessarily be fascist."

Vanaik in his presentation is totally silent on the class base of fascism. This forces him to turn to ideological realms to characterise the nature of Hindu nationalism. In a subtle shift from class analysis, to analysing 'nation' Vanaik dumps the materialist understanding in the bin and walks on the crutches of idealism "In last 15 years ..... there has been the dramatic rise of politics of cultural exclusivisms and xenophobia.... we are witness to four forms of which the politics of exclusivity have taken .... rise of religious fundamentalism.... HIndu nationalism .... spreading and swelling of carbuncles of racist and anti immigrant xenophobia in the first world. Vanaik does relate all these phenomenon to global changes in correlation and feels that politics of identity has by and large overshadowed the politics of class. He sees this movement, the political vehicle of religious fundamentalism not as fascist but only potentially so, it is an Indian variant of a generic phenomenon but does not belong to the genus of fascism.

Discussion

Different scattered views, not necessarily mutually exclusive are prevelant in the sociological domain. The communal nature of SP is very obvious at the very first level of approximation. Its fundamentalist character is easily discernible from its clinging to religious expressions. The proper characterisation can come by constantly relating the social roots with the political manifestations of the SP.

To begin with since Fascism has been a very major category which came into being and has serious implications, it is necessary to understand the 'core' of Fascism. Narratives and analysis on Fascism can go on and on at different levels. Martin Kitchen (19) has tried to give a succint summary of this phenomenon. It is a ultraconservative movement rejecting liberal values, projects soverignty of nation as absolute supreme, glorifies martial spirit, dictatorship of supreme dictator, calls for subordination of rights of individuals to the 'states' soverignty'. It tends to identify the 'enemy' 'the culprit' for social ills, terrorising the social psyche and suspending the human rights.

The social backdrop of this ideology and social movement is 'fright' of the properties classes by the unrest of the poor. Extreme poverty, inflation, malnutrition, unemployment are the ground on which unrest of the poor is founded. Along with section of the propertied classed it is the response of middle classes to the unrest of poor, unemployed and different social movement (organized working class in case of classical fascism). The major thrust of attack of fascist movement is on 'human rights' movements (trade union movement in case of German Fascism).

The core of Fascist movement is a threatened middle class, threatened by the struggles of the oppressed in the backdrop of general scarcity of resources. The European Fascism came up as a cataclysm which gripped the society in a brief span of time for a brief span of time. SP movements theoretical underpinnings began decades ago. The ideological exercises and consolidation has been going on since then. Despite a vast network of Shakha's and their followers in the state apparatus they were not a social force till 80's. 80's saw the turmoil of lower castes, asserting itself. The response was anti-dalit riots spread all over the country. The Gujarat anti dalit riots of 1980 are a clear example of this. The twin processes: formation of cash crop rich peasants, the small industrialists and urbanised middle class acquired a substantial presence by 80's. The precipitation of this amorphous mass into SP movement was brought in by many factors: the main of these was the 'Mandalisation', which brought together the 'core supporters of fascism (Rich peasants, small industrialists and sections of middle classes), threatened by assertion of the low castes, poor etc., immediately rallied around the SP.

It was not possible for SP to keep openly attacking the lower castes and other oppressed sections of society. A clever manoeuver has taken place here. The real project of this 'core fascist supporters' is to keep the dalits, poor workers and women in their place. (Also this can not be done openly due to the seeping in of liberal values in society). The upper castes have a morbid fear of protecting their privileges and social status. Last few decades have seen a systematic, subtle campaign to degrade 'reservations' and to look down upon those who avail of these reservations. Also they hate the movements supporting the rights of poor peasants and workers. The latter especially are the 'hate objects' for the upcoming 'petty industrialists'. One is not sure about what the extent of impact the 'women's rights' movement has been on the upper caste Hindu males in particular, but one can broadly say that the upcoming movement of self assertion of rights of women added up to the insecurity which this group faced in the society. Thus broadly in the complex class/caste/gender scenario the petty bourgeoisie, in this context, the upper caste Hindu male was looking for an ideology, support system and a political movement which can suppress the aspirations of these groups, as they were threatening his social and political power.

With the development of liberal ethos worldwide it is not possible, not to pay lip service to casteless society, gender equality and human rights in general. One (upper class/caste) hates these human rights but one has to either (a) distract attention from the situations which gives space for struggle to these or (b) propogates alternative set of value system which without directly opposing these 'threats' to their status, obfuscates these sharp formulations to propogate the ideology which neutralises the sharpness of these assertions.

'Hindutva' fits in the bill excellently. One one hand it creates an external enemy image in the hapless 'muslim' on whose head are dumped all the historical ignomities, the causation of present evils, and in this direction creates an 'enemy' who is to be hated, fought against, repeatedly subjected to street violence to 'ghettoise' him and this process is done with 'hysterical intensity, the pitch of which subsumes all the other genuine voices of struggling oppressed groups. The enemy's projection through 'manufacturing history', 'doctoring mass consciousness' is taken to a level whereby the 'anti-enemy' pogrom can be initiated at will, while the communalised social consciousness and communalised state appraratus aids and abetts it. The 'enemy' in this case is an extension of the low caste shudra, all attempts are made to engineer the hatred between the two, with the purpose that the latter can be used against the former. This whole process is so much full of 'social passion' that a terrorising atmosphere is created which is the best way to suppress the liberalism and the accompanying social space for the struggles of the oppressed groups.

'Hindutva' also has the 'merit' at another level. After 'excluding the other', all the remaining ones are Hindus. They are projected to be a homogenous Hindu mass, in which each has and 'assigned' 'dharma' to which each has to stick for the harmonious society to flower. The concept of homogenous and harmonious is propogated by the upholders of the status quo, by those who are beneficiaries in the present power equations. It is proclaimed, ours is a casteless society, the caste politics is divisive, we should (the lower castes) overcome the caste psychology, even at a time when caste exploitation is going on at full speed. The women is given the 'respectable' place of 'mother' and a 'sister' 'wife' and 'daughter' these relations which the patriarchs exploit to the hilt. The workers are supposed to be doing the productive activity for the 'nation' and so should conform to the present exploitative, unjust laws, lest the 'nation' will suffer. In this 'national' project the unrestricted right of employer to exploit is conspicious by its silent presence.

Thus nothing can fit into the political project of 'upper caste male', than the political construct of Hindutva. Unlike the fascisms of Europe whose occurrence was cataclysmic, Indian Fascism, is chronic and sub-acute. It comes in paroxysms and every occurrence of its exacerbation leaves a broader consolidation for itself. Every occurrence of its offense, leaves the 'other' more helpless and ghettoised. This ghettoisation is a necessary accompaniment of Brahminical domination, hegemony of Hindutva. Brahminical exclusivity needs a ghetto, be it of a untouchable centuries ago, or of a muslim in 20th century (nay probably even in 21st century for that matter).

Hindutva in essence is fascism, as to use Vanaik's 'Fascist minimum' criterion, its the 'core' and class character which should determine the nature of a movement, either in opposition or in power. Fascism's core, the minimum, is the middle class base. Hindutva's core, the social base is the cash crop farmer, the petty industrialist and multiple segments of middle classes (bureaucracy, professionals, traders etc) latched on to the big capital. The peripheral manifestations apart, which can change in place and time, Fascism and Hindutva share the commonality, the same social base. Hindutva is a sub-acute, chronic Fascism of a caste-ridden, post colonial society.

Where does Hindutva differ from the Fascisms of European variety. To begin with the ideological base and cadre of Hindutva were prepared for decades by the brahminism, before the change in social dynamics resulted in threat to the power of its social constituency fell back and on a ready-made formation. In between period there were many individuals, from these segments who had veered around to its politics. Secondly Hindutva, as a fascist variant, has invaded the social image in a much more consistent and planned way. Unlike cataclysmic Fascisms, its dedicated soldiers infiltrated army, bureaucracy, police, media and education for decades to prepare a conducive ground for smooth walk-in of the Hindutva in the social space.

Thirdly probably because of the above, Hindutva does not need a 'radical' rhetoric of 'socialism' or some such, which was used by European Fascisms. The absence of radical rhetoric is a strength of Hindutva as it eliminates the need to undertake radical social reforms whenever it succeeds in capturing the power in small sectors, states, of the country. In a way Hindutva is a organically stronger variety of Fascism as it does not need the radical rhetoric to propel its engine. Their is another subtle problem in native Fascism. The unspoken north-south divide. The imageries of Hindutva are mainly around north Indian upper caste male. This hegemony is yet to succeed in its goal in subjugating the non-Hindi speaking regions. With the rise of cash crop farmers and other social bases of Hindutva, in non-Hindi speaking regions also, there is a marginal possibility of this movement getting some foothold in these regions as well. But probably the extent of this will be too small.

The chronicity, i.e. slow speed of this movement has its inherent problems. Where as on one hand it can capture the social space, on the other it can also elicit a reaction to itself. This reaction to it from dalits, workers, women, section of middle class which is secular, is a big obstacle to the march of Hindutva. Big capital, the major industrial houses have a unique relation with SP. Whenever faced with crisis to their own existences the socially terrorising atmosphere created by SP helps the bourgeiosic to wriggle out of the compulsions of liberalism. The conservative movement of SP helps the needs of capital to keep thriving in an uninterrupted way. The noises of 'swadeshi' and the multispeak' adopted by different 'sons' of the RSS are an indication enough that overall the Hindutva project does not go against the global nature, 'computer chips', 'potato chips', 'Dump Enron in the Arabian Sea' (and bring it back through the roads of Konkan)', while the Indian capital continues its logical trajectory of more and more firmly becoming the part of global capital with uneven playing field, on which it has to play while the unfair immigration laws and hegemony of richer countries increasing the miseries of the poor people of the poor countries.

Thus this, chronic, resilient, thriving fascism, expressed through the idomitable vehicle of SP continues to throw up different shades of its existence, sometimes terrorising (to the poor and minorities) sometimes aggressive (to the neighboring 'enemy' countries), sometimes appearing to collapse under the weight of its own contradictions. But the march, at the moment is on. The social roots of Hindutva are all for the support and continuation of the repressive capitalist regime; sustaining the bourgeisic aspirations, while continuing to pursue its own project.

At present the situation is fairly in balance. The onslaught has achieved mammoth proportions in the north, but south and east is comparatively unaffected by its paranoid aggression. The reaction of dalits, though fragmented is definitely going to retard the march of the 'Rath' of Hindutva.

The target of SP, the muslims are in a bind. On one hand they have been battered so much by Hindutva, that they cannot afford to lie quiet about it. Secondly unlike the dalits they lie in a subcritical zone of backwardness where they find it difficult to come out of the grip of their own 'religious leaders', 'the muslim obscurantists' posing to be speaking on behalf of 'their community. Thus they face a double attack from both Hindu Fascism and Muslim fundamentalism. Probably the suffering of the 'poor muslims' is so great they will be forced to come out and resist the 'bears hug' of SP and sidetracking their 'leaders' will pose definite obstacle to the march of Trishuls of Hindutva. How SP overcomes this problem, which new 'velvet gloves' it discovers to remove this obstacle remains to be seen.

Conclusion: Combating Fascism

The core of fascist movement is to suppress and suspend the rights of the oppressed. It is a social agenda of shaken, threatened middle class in the service of big bourgeisic. It is a mass movement, Hindutva is the political agenda of petty industrialists, sections of middle classes and rich peasantry blessed by capital. Hindutva aims to create the new ghettoised untouchables, the poor muslims, a la the shudra of the olden times and keeping this goal in mind it wants to suppress/sidetrack the social andpolitical aspirations of dalits, workers and women.

With growth of autonomous movements each struggling sector is asserting itself through small attempts to work for, to wrest its rights. This is a non-hegemonic way of struggle of the oppressed. Unfortunately this has a potential of advancement in liberal atmosphere only, where these fragmented, isolated struggles and movements can stand on their own feet to march towards their goals.

Hindutva is succeeding in creating a social atmosphere, where it will be difficult for these struggles to be carried on properly. Already lot of hurdles are cropping up in the march of these movements. These movements share an anti-authoritarianism which can be the basis of there coming together, to combat Hindutva, despite their seemingly diverse social agendas. The common platform which coordinates, without suppressing the aspirations of individual constitutents, can aim against the Fascistic Hindutva and strengthen the secular, democratic rights of large sections of society. That alone can form the basis of secular, democratic ethos, which can stand upto the onslaught of Hindutva and in the long term show it, its place in the history, the dustbin.

Acknowledgement

(I am thankful to Irfan Engineer, Jairus Banaji and Vrijendra for the discussions which helped me formulate my ideas. However responsibility and weaknesses of these formulations are entirely mine.)

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